Manufacturing Matters- Tuesday Top-Up 27

And finally- a plea from our MAKE│NZ Digital Engagement Specialist (me, Sabine). Our LinkedIn is currently sat at 419 followers. If we can get it to 500 then Dieter will be forced to buy me a coffee (he will be finding this out at the same time as you all, this is a surprise addition to the newsletter after he’s poured his efforts into writing it). Like many of you I’m sure, caffeine is the WD-40 to my rusty work-brain. Please help the community (and me) by spreading the word and encouraging others to check out our LinkedIn.

round white ceramic saucer and coffee cup

The direct impact of such a measure, were it to be imposed, would be pretty obvious in the case of the US. MSC CEO Soren Toft, for example, said earlier last week the world’s largest container carrier could visit fewer U.S. ports to limit its exposure to the new fees. Beyond that, and regarding potential impacts on shipping to and from New Zealand, we’d have to wait and see. But given that the network of international shipping is a fairly complicated system, local collateral damage can’t be ruled out.

In Germany alone, the new government announced a €400bn loan to boost military spending – on top of the €100bn extra-ordinary loan for military expenditure taken up in 2023. That announcement has since been amend to “Whatever it takes …”

EU defence spending on all military equipment (‘investment’) has risen sharply over the past decade:

Overall, the EU defence industry generated sales of €158.8 billion in 2023 with about 40% exported to non-EU countries, and directly employing 581,000 people. Companies in the UK, France, and Italy are the main actors. To put this in perspective, defence industry employment makes up 0.3% of total employment in the EU in the 20-64 years age group.

What will the dramatic shift in demand – if it were to eventuate – do to Europe’s manufacturing industries, and international supply chains? The examples of re-allocating manufacturing operations to arms production in the UK and the US during WW II are well-known. In more recent wars involving Western nations, the impact on manufacturing were far less dramatic. The Gulf War (1990-91) did not require full industrial mobilization due to pre-existing stockpiles of weapons and equipment built up during the 1980s.

Technically, the EU is not at war with Russia in the Ukraine, but that war still had and has a significant impact on levels of key military equipment in the EU (and the US) available for their own delpoyment. The new demand for (a lot) more military equipment won’t be satisfied at all from existing stockpiles. Also, for political reasons and based on the most recent developments, EU leaders are adamant that key weapon systems have to be sourced from within Europe. That is going to pose an interesting challenge in its own right. According to the latest SIPRI report, published yesterday, the share of EU arms imports from the US rose steeply to 64% over the past four years, and the EU is now the biggest market for US military exports at 35%.

Not to mention, of course, what the massive increase in debt levels in the EU will do to key economic and financial factors like interest rates and levels of inflation. Europe is far away, but it may still be a good idea to check your seatbelts …

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