Manufacturing Matters- Tuesday Top-Up 106

☕ Coffee for Makers – Celebrating Made in New Zealand!

We often talk about Made in New Zealand, but behind everything we make are the people, businesses and communities that make it possible.

To celebrate Made in New Zealand Week, MAKE│NZ is bringing local manufacturers together for six informal morning coffee catch-ups.

Come say hello, reconnect with old mates, meet some new faces and celebrate the people who keep New Zealand making!

☕ Where to find us:

  • Mon 23 Nov: Artisan Bakery by Rangiora Bakery
  • Tue 24 Nov: Untouched World Kitchen, Harewood
  • Wed 25 Nov: Cafe Fix, Bromley
  • Thu 26 Nov: Allpress Espresso, Addington
  • Fri 27 Nov: Organika – Honey and Coffee, Rolleston
  • Mon 30 Nov: Columbus Coffee, Hornby

⏰ 7:30–8:30 am at every location.

Pop in for 10 minutes or stay for the hour. Coffee is free for MAKE│NZ members and half-price for non-member manufacturers.

Bring your business card, invite a neighbouring manufacturer or bring a mate from the industry.

Let’s get together, share a coffee and keep New Zealand making!


Swell have reached out to let us know about an upcoming event for manufacturers –

Innovation Funding on Tap

It’ll be a relaxed afternoon exploring innovation funding opportunities for Kiwi businesses, including the R&D Tax Incentive. We’ll also hear from Mars Bioimaging about their R&D funding journey, followed by drinks and networking on us.

News from the World of Manufacturing

In that context Alan suggested that “Perhaps it’s time for a national conversation on what are the key manufacturing things, the key industries that we want to keep? It might not always be manufacturing, but what are the key industries we want to keep for that national resilience piece?”

That raises a couple of interesting questions:

  • A ‘national conversation’ – who would organise and facilitate such a conversation? Who would be responsible for implementing the recommendations emerging from such a conversation?
  • ‘That national resilience piece’ – in the face of any future serious disruptions of international supply chains, do we seriously believe that we could operate as a country for any length of time reliant on our own resources? We surely wouldn’t have to starve – at least not until we run out of critical spare parts for tractors and milk tankers, but beyond that? Which sectors of manufacturing / the economy could we realistically expand so we become less reliant on imports / fully self-sufficient, and at what (opportunity) cost?

The obvious response to above is that (central) government would have to develop a sector policy for manufacturing and invest in supporting those parts of the manufacturing sector it favours – as it has been doing at considerable expense in other sectors like – the screen industry and the video game industry, or tourism, for example.

However, do we even have the ‘industries’ in manufacturing in New Zealand that Alan must have in mind? Obviously we do in food and primary processing, but beyond that?

Alan mentioned composites, others, including politicians and local EDAs, often mention medical devices and the space industry. Taking the latter as an example, a recent report on the industry estimates the space industry across all sector activities employs about 7,000 FTE. There is no breakdown into activities by employment, but if we take turnover as a proxy, space manufacturing makes up 15% of the total:

Or take health tech. The 2024 TIN100 New Zealand Health Tech report mentions almost 5,900 FTEs in total; half of these are employed by F&P Healthcare (2,900). For reference, the total manufacturing workforce in New Zealand is 239,500 as of February 2026.

By way of comparison, aircraft and space manufacturing in France employs about 8.1% of the total manufacturing workforce (230,500 / 2.832m). As another example of a strong sector focus, automotive and automotive component manufacturing in Germany (still) employs almost 732,000 FTE, that’s 13.5% of the total manufacturing workforce.

This is not meant to belittle these industries – on the contrary! They are important contributors to our manufacturing sector, which is in itself remarkably resilient – we’ve maintained employment at or above 240,000 employees for the last 20 years, with a 10% dip for about five years post GFC. Over the same period, manufacturing employment in the UK, for example, fell by more than half a million FTEs and its share of the total working population fell from about 10.4% to 6.7%. To be fair, employment data only tell part of the success or failure story here, but still

A big factor in the consistent strength of our manufacturing sector is its diversity, including but not restricted to composites, medical devices and spacecraft. What New Zealand’s ‘apex manufacturers’, supported by complex domestic supply chains, make can be found in all sorts of geographies and applications – often as component supplies to global capital goods companies. As Sir Paul Callaghan used to say “Our brilliance has been in the ‘weird stuff’ that the big players don’t think to exploit.”

While organically grown rather than a consequence of some clever economic development strategy, we should consider ourselves lucky. When you look at second- and third-tier automotive component manufacturers in Southern Germany right now, or even a big player like Bosch, the risks of being part of a large manufacturing ecosystem where there are only a handful of ‘apex manufacturers’ – in this case assemblers like Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Porsche and the like – and they are all in the same industry, the exposure this creates becomes starkly obvious.

Against that background, what would a ‘national conversation’ about the future direction of New Zealand manufacturing look like and what would it achieve – government picking winners, and changing its views on who the winners should be every three years? That is certainly not something Sir Paul would have supported.

What government can and must do is support manufacturing by performing in the disciplines it controls and should be good at. Access to people with the right skills (education; vocational education and training; immigration), capital (a tax regime that rewards investment in innovation) and energy (reliable supply of affordable electricity), for example. We’ve covered that in some detail in last week’s newsletter.

Fun Facts (some of them not so funny)

Concerns over the rapid expansion of the network of data centres in the USA – and AI in general – appear to have played a key role in the recent US elections at Federal, State and local levels. Among US economists, these concerns are focused on two questions:

  • Are we putting too many apples in one basket in terms of the size of the investment in AI relative to the value created by our economy (share of GDP)?
  • Are we allocating too much of our productive investment to one sector of our economy, to the detriment of other sectors?

Two definitions: ‘investment in AI’ includes the money spent by the ‘hyperscalers’ on developing their models; computing hardware excluding data centre infrastructure; data centre infrastructure; and investments made by so-called Independent Power Producers (IPP) – third-party generators of the electricity required to operate data centres.

‘Productive investment’ covers all three asset classes – venture capital, private equity and private credit.

This early in the journey, data required to answer these questions aren’t that easy to come by, so the estimates below should just be taken as indicative only. First, investment as a share of GDP:

Investment in AI has clearly accelerated significantly over the past four years; the return of that investment in terms of contributions to GDP growth has been a bit more patchy recently – but that’s a different story

A recent report by the McKinsey Global Institute confirms that investment in data centres and their computing hardware equipment has risen significantly since 2022, but overall investment (as a share of GDP) hasn’t. That would indicate a ‘displacement effect’ – AI investment crowding out investment in other productive sectors of the economy, such as manufacturing – but note the difference in scale. Thus, the size of such a displacement effect would be small so far:

Note the difference in scale for the Y-axis!

However, until recently the hyperscalers funded most of their model development from internal sources. That has now changed – see also the impending Anthropic IPO:

The answer to the second question – AI’s share of all productive investment, as opposed to share of GDP – is more difficult to find, depending on what’s included, or not. Estimates range from 3% to the 10% provided by Goldman Sachs below:

The other term that is being used in relation to the US AI investment figures is “unprecedented”. In terms of the share of GDP, that appears to be a fair description, even bigger than the railroad boom that started 150 years ago:

When it comes to the share of all productive investment, however, the ‘Railroad Tycoons’ of the late 19th century have it all over the ‘Tech Bros’:

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